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MORTALITY TABLES AND THE SEX-STEREOTYPE DOCTRINE:
INHERENT DISCRIMINATION IN PENSION ANNUITIES
I. Introduction
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)1 has triggered
nationwide redesign of pension plans and reevaluation of many important fi-
nancial and actuarial procedures.2 Nevertheless, one crucial factor inherent in
all mortality based plans is being overlooked: sex discrimination. This discrimi-
nation results from the different actuarially determined life expectancies of men
and women. If an employer contributes equally to retirement annuities for men
and women, a woman employee will receive a smaller periodic benefit than a
man, due to her longer life expectancy. Conversely, if an employer provides for
equal periodic benefits, he must pay more for the woman's retirement annuity.8
Therefore, whether the plan provides for equal contributions or for equal benefits,
the underlying financial and actuarial assumptions dictate that male and female
employees are treated differently.
The law applicable to sex discrimination in pension plans is scarred with
inconsistencies. The Equal Pay Act of 1963" which is enforced by the Wage and
Hour Division of the Labor Department specifically outlaws wage differentials
based on sex. The legislative intent and a strict reading of the statutory excep-
tions would require that both contributions and benefits be equal. The Division's
approach in analogous situations, however, indicates that the employer's contri-
butions are the dispositive consideration. Yet in the area of pension plans, the
Division has taken neither position in holding that either equal contributions
or equal benefits satisfy the Act.5
On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has applied Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 to pension
plans," prohibiting sex-based differences in pension benefits.8 Therefore, not-
withstanding sex differences inherent in plans using actuarial tables, the employer
must make contributions which, though larger for one sex than the other, yield
equal periodic benefits.' By making it more expensive to employ a woman, this
EEOC ruling is counterproductive to the spirit of Title VII legislation.0 It
allows dissimilar treatment of men and women who are homogenous in all other
respects, while ignoring the economic realities of such treatment.
The overlapping jurisdiction of these two statutes encourages an employer
to fulfill the EEOC requirements which also satisfies the Division's standards.
Therefore, as applied, two acts which were both intended to prevent dissimilar
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1970).
2 34 BNA PENSION REP. A-1.
3 See text accompanying note 24 infra.
4 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
5 WAGE-HoUR OPINION LETTER No. 1276 (WH-224), Apr. 26, 1973.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2003-2000e-15 (1970).
7 Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971).
8 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1972).
9 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1972).
10 Bernstein & Williams, Title VII And The Problem Of Sex Classifications In Pension
Programs, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 1203 (1974).
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treatment based on sex are satisfied by financially penalizing an employer for
hiring a woman. Struck by this irony, the courts have looked to the essence of
the legislation and have held that applying sex-based stereotypes to individuals
is discriminatory. This sex-stereotype doctrine, which originated under Title
VII, logically requires that both contributions and benefits must be equal. At
least in dicta, this doctrine has also been read into the Equal Pay Act through
both § 703(h) 1' of Title VII and a strict reading of statutory Equal Pay excep-
tions.
By using a simplified model, it is possible to demonstrate the employer's
plight, discuss the inconsistencies and developments in the applicable law, and,
while not arriving at a solution, point out the practical ramifications of this
problem under ERISA.
II. The Problem
Due to statistically different life expectancies, the planned periodic return
from a life annuity of equal size will be less for a woman than for a man. 2 In
fact, a substantial difference exists. Hypothetically, ABC, Inc. wishes to provide
its employees with a maximum ' straight life retirement annuity through a single
employer plan. 4 For the purposes of this model, the following assumptions are
made: 1) the plan will pay out a straight life retirement annuity;"s 2) interest
and payout periods coincide and occur at the end of the year;" 3) guaranteed
interest is five percent per annum;'" 4) life expectancy differentials are de-
termined by a simple five-year setback;"8 5) there are no provisions for employee
contributions ;1" and 6) M and F, a male and female employee, are homogenous
in every respect and earn $12,000.00 per year.
If ABC, Inc. uses a defined contribution plan,2" and makes the maximum
contributions allowed under ERISA,2' then the annual annuity income that
results upon retirement at age 65 will be: 2
2
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
12 See text accompanying note 23 infra.
13 See text accompanying note 21 infra.
14 Multiemployer Plans are subject to different rules. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 414(f).
15 ERISA requires that plans offering an annuity must allow election of joint and survivor
annuities. The problem of discrimination is demonstrated in principle by the single straight
life annuity. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055 (1974).
16 This assumption simplifies the compound interest aspects of the model.
17 This figure is higher than the usual 2.5 percent of the last 20 years. But it is an
aspect of the "new money" of the last five years.
18 This is a standard method used in rating and charging schedules by many insurers.
Although not as accurate as working from a commutation table, it serves the purpose of the
model.
19 The equations for computing maximums are slightly different if employee contributions
are involved. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 415(b)-(c).
20 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(34) (1974) states: "The term 'individual account plan' or
'defined contribution plan' means a pension plan which provides for an individual account
for each participant and for benefits based solely on participant's account."
E. IsCKs, AccoUNTING FOR THE COST OF PENSION PLANS 142 (1965) defines "defined
contribution plan" as:
A pension plan which '(a) states the benefits to be received by employees after retire-
ment or the method of determining such benefits. (b) accompanies a separate agree-
ment that provides a formula for calculating the employer's contributions.
21 The maximum contribution under these assumptions is $3,000 per year. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 415(c).
22 This assumes a full vesting of the benefits upon retirement.
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TABLE 123:
Years Annual Annuity Income
Employed M's Fs Difference (M's-F's)
4 1,308 1,089 218
6 2,064 1,719 344
8 2,897 2,413 484
10 3,817 3,179 637
20 10,034 8,357 1,676
30 20,162 16,793 3,369
40 36,660 30,533 6,126
Although a difference of a few thousand dollars might seem negligible, the
significance of this income differential increases when accumulated over several
years: if M and F were employed for 30 years, at age 73 the difference in their
total retirement income would be $26,955; sex is the sole basis for this difference.
If, on the other hand, ABC, Inc. uses a defined benefit plan24 to avoid the
differential in annual annuity income, then the annual employer contributions
are:
TABLE II
Contributions Per Year
By ABC, Inc.
Annual Total Difference
Years Annuity for the Years
Employed Income for M for F Difference Employed
4 4,800 11,009 13,217 2,208 8,835
6 7,200 10,464 12,563 2,099 12,596
8 9,600 9,706 11,931 2,225 17,805
10 12,000 9,431 11,323 1,892 18,923
20 12,000 3,587 4,307 719 14,396
30 12,000 1,785 2,143 358 10,747
40 12,000 982 1,179 197 7,881
Attaching lost investment or interest income to the extra contributions required
for women further aggravates the sex-based differences in an employer's pension
costs.
23 Tables I and II are computed through standard annuity and present value formulas.
S.ee P. RInER, MAT EmAxTICS OF INVESTMENT 49-105 (1961); T. SIMPSON, MATHEMATICS OF
FINANCE 231-77 (1969); J. VALENTINE, QuANTrrATIvE TECHNIQUES FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
62-64, 108-23 (1971).
24 The term "defined benefit plan" means a pension plan other than an individual account
plan. 29 U.S.O.A. § 1002(35) (1974). The American Institute of Certified Public Accounts
defines "defined benefit plan" as follows:
A pension plan stating the benefits to be received by employees after retirement, or
the method of determining such benefits. The employer's contributions under such a
plan are determined actuarially on the basis of the benefits expected to become pay-
able.
HICKs, supra note 20.
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III. The Law
As the model demonstrates, both methods yield a difference based solely on
sex. Therefore, a strict construction of the Equal Pay Act dictates that both
should be a violation. The Division's application of the Act in analogous situations
suggests, however, that only unequal contributions are a violation. In fact, as the
Act has been applied, neither plan independently is an Equal Pay violation. The
essence of Title VII indicates that both plans are violations, yet as applied by the
EEOC, only the unequal benefits violate Title VII. The sex-stereotype doctrine,
however, clearly indicates that both methods should violate both statutes.
A. Wage & Hour: The Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act applies to employers and employee organizations other-
wise covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act,25 but does not reach employee
hiring or job classification.2 6 The Act provides in pertinent part:
No Employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate . . .. between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs in the per-
formance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions .... 27
The Act is the fruit of congressional concern over the economic and social
consequences of different wage treatment based on sex.28 Allowing either un-
equal benefits or unequal contributions ignores this intent. The large differences
in periodic retirement income in Table I readily evidences the economic con-
sequences of different treatment by sex.29 This income gap of 20 percent could
feasibly result in an entirely different standard of living. The social and economic
consequences of the unequal contributions in Table II are more subtle, but are
present nonetheless.8 "
Retirement benefits are a function of annual income, and the employer is
encouraged to discriminate against women since it costs more to initiate a woman
into the pension plan initially, and any promotion to higher compensated positions
widens this cost difference. The economic conditions of the 1970's mandate a
concern over the economic and social consequences of these incentives" to dis-
criminate. Unless both contributions and benefits are equal, these problems are
not alleviated under the Act as Congress intended.
This conclusion is strengthened by reference to the intent behind the
25 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
26 Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 315 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
27 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
28 109 CONG. R c. 9212 (1963) (remarks of Representative Donahue).
29 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
30 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
31 Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10.
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statutory exceptions to the Equal Pay Act. 2 Of the four exceptions, only §
206(d) (1) (iv) applies to this problem: "a differential based on any factor other
than sex." 3  Congress, intending by this subsection to eliminate subjective
assumptions and traditional stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of
women's work,"4 refused to restrict § 206(d) (1) (iv) to differences "solely on
the basis of sex." ' Sex-based mortality tables might have been justified under
such an exception, but Congress rejected it.
The Wage & Hour Division also realized the importance of the narrow ap-
plication of this exception. In an interpretive bulletin, it pointed out that "the
requirements for such an exception are not met unless the factor of sex provides
no basis for the wage differential."3 6 With the courts having accepted this narrow
reading of the exception,' the picture is almost complete: congressional intent,
statutory text, administrative bulletin, and case law all maintain that sex can play
no role in different wage treatment of employees, yet administrative rulings do
not fall within this pattern.
The Division's enforcement history of the Equal Pay Act has avoided re-
quiring equal benefits and contributions; the focus has been on contributions. A
good example is the treatment of insurance. The Division excluded sex as a factor
in determining coverage by a hospital insurance plan. 8 However, the amount of
the benefits and the extent of dependency coverage were allowed to be differenti-
ated by sex as long as employer contributions were equal 9 or the employer did
not contribute at all.4
A similar analytical focus on contributions has not been applied to mortality
based pension plans. In 1965, Wage & Hour stated that the Equal Pay Act
will look to either the contribution or the benefit and will not deal with the
actuarial method of determining that benefit."' This position was reiterated in
1966 when the Division stated that if the contributions are equal, then unequal
benefits are not an Equal Pay violation.4 2 Furthermore, in 1973 the Division's
most recent opinion stated that either benefits or contributions must be equal.42
These rulings do not flow from the equal contribution approach of the
Division. Furthermore, they conflict with the congressional intent established
previously. Therefore, the 1973 ruling is seemingly only a measure to avert con-
flict with the EEOC.
32 "Recognizing that the concept of wage payment discrimination against women is false
S. . this represents the correction of basic injustice being visited upon women in many fields
of endeavor." 109 CONG. Rc. 9212 (1963) (remarks of Representative Donahue).
33 The other three exceptions are: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; and (3)
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of products.
34 Shultz v. First Victoria Natl Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1969).
35 110 CONG. RIc. 2728 (1964) (remarks of Representative Dowdy).
36 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1972).
37 Hodgson v. Security Nael Bank, 460 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1972), citing 29 C.F.R. §
800.142 (1972).
38 WAGE-HOUR SPEECH, Jan. 10, 1966; WAGE-HouR OPINION LETTER No. 394, Oct.
27, 1965, No. 388, Oct. 14, 1965.
39 WAGE-HouR OPINION LETTER No. 484, Aug. 3, 1966.
40 WAGE-HoUR SPEECH, Jan. 10, 1966.
41 WAGE-HOUR OPINION LETTER No. 406, Nov. 24, 1965.
42 WAoE-HoUR OPINION LETTER No. 484, Aug. 3, 1966; 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1964).
43 WAGE-HOUR OPINION LETTER No. 1276 (WH-224), Apr. 26, 1973.
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B. EEOC: Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act strives to eliminate disparate treatment
of women by placing them on an equal footing with male employees. 5 Section
703 (a) (1) of the Act is the most critical for pensions:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer...
(1) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 46
The EEOC has long recognized that retirement and pension plans are "con-
ditions of employment" within the meaning of the Act. Prior to 1972, the
EEOC simply required that an employer satisfy the Wage & Hour require-
ments under Equal Pay in order to satisfy Title VII." However, in 1972 the
Commission interpreted Title -VII as demanding equal benefits under §
703 (a) (1)." Therefore, pension provisions which allow one sex to retire at an
earlier age than the other,5" and plans with different survivor benefits based on
sex,5 different dependance coverage for one sex than the other,52 and different
fringe benefits of all types5" were brought within the scope of § 703 (a) (1) by the
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.54
As indicated in Table II, providing equal benefits causes a large cost dif-
ferential. If the EEOC accepted this cost difference as a defense for benefit dif-
ferences, their position would have effectively been unchanged. Therefore, to
ensure equal benefits, the EEOC refused to accept this cost differential as a valid
defense to a § 703 (a) violation.5
Nor is lack of intent to discriminate a valid defense, since merely an intent
to do that which turns out to be discriminatory" is sufficient. Other defenses
which might have legally sustained mortality based plans have also been dis-
credited. The administrative convenience, which the tables provide, is not a
valid justification for the discrimination. 7 The fact that the tables are partially
based on nondiscriminatory considerations is also of little aid. Therefore, if
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
45 Gerstie v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 545, 550 (D. Colo. 1973).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
47 Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Peters v.
Missouri-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc. 444 F.2d
1186 (7th Cir. 1971); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974); Mixson v.
Southern Bell, 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 27 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
48 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a)-(b) (1967).
49 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1972).
50 Id. See Peters v. Missouri-Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974).
51 Mixson v. Southern Bell, 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 27 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
52 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d) (1972).
53 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1972).
54 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1972).
55 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1972).
56 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Roger v. International Paper Co.,
510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc., 431 F.2d 245 '(10th
Cir. 1970); Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
57 Polelle v. HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
58 King v. Laborer's Local 818, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971).
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mortality based plans are to be saved as an exception to Title VII, the prospects
are limited to the business necessity exception.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,59 the Second Circuit held that an
employer must meet the following criteria to establish the business necessity de-
fense: 1) the act must do more than serve a legitimate managerial function; 2)
the act must be essential to the ends of safety and efficiency; and 3) there cannot
be any less discriminatory alternative."0
The tables do serve a legitimate managerial function as a basis for planning,
costing-out, tax matters, and simplifying administrative procedures. And while
the tables also promote efficiency, this is not enough to meet the first two prongs
of the Bethlehem test. As for the third requirement, there are any number of
factors that demonstrate higher statistical validity for life expectancy than does
the factor of sex.6
These mortality based plans, then, do not fall within the business necessity
exception.
C. The Sex-Stereotype Doctrine
1. Under Title VII
Ironically, even if one satisfies both Acts as applied by the Division and the
Commission, employees are being treated differently solely because of sex. Perhaps
this is why many courts have looked to the nature of the discrimination in their
decisions: employees should not be treated differently on the basis of general
sex-class stereotypes.62 This approach was first used under Title VII.
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,"3 the court extended
§ 703 of the Civil Rights Act to all differences in the treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes. In 1971, the EEOC determined that the
height criterion is inherently discriminatory and hence subject to strict scrutiny.64
In Rosenfeld v. South Pacific Co.,65 the Ninth Circuit held that regulating the
hours women could work and the weight they could lift violated Title VII.
This sex-stereotype approach has also been applied to sex-plus criteria. In
Sprogis v. United Air Lines Inc.,66 the Seventh Circuit struck down a no marriage
rule for women flight cabin attendants. The defendant insisted that Title VII
did not apply because the rule discriminated against married women as opposed
to single women and not as opposed to men. The court noted that Congress had
intended to eliminate the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
59 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
60 Id. at 662.
61 See, e.g., Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. RYv.
624 (1973), discussing factors such as height, weight, smoking, etc.
62 See Silbowitz v. HEW, 95 S. Ct. 1503 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(applying equal protection to sex discrimination).
63 482 F.2d 535 '(5th Cir. 1973).
64 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide 6223; EEOC Decision Case No. 71-1418 (1971). For similar
holding, see Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973); 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1970); Hardy v. Stumpf, 37 Cal. 3d 958, 112 Cal. Rptr. 738 (App. 1974).
65 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
66 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
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women resulting from sex stereotypes. The Sprogis approach would necessarily
find sex-based mortality tables in pension plans discriminatory.
Other statistically valid regulations have failed under the sex-stereotype
standard. For example, in 1969 the EEOC invalidated a retirement plan that
allowed a lump-sum option only to women below the age of 50. The option was
premised on statistical proof that men remained in employment longer than
women. EEOC, however, refused to accept the statistical evidence as a defense."'
From the standpoint of statistical assumptions, the recent cases dealing with
regulations excluding pregnancy from temporary disability coverage present the
closest parallel to the application of the sex-stereotype doctrine to sex-based
mortality tables." Therefore, the court's strict application of the sex-stereotype
doctrine in those maternity cases weighs heavily on the future of mortality based
pension plans. In Gilbert v. General Electric Co. 9 and Sale v. Waverly-Shell
Rock Board of Education,"0 federal district courts invalidated the disability
exclusions. The Sale court pointed out that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not
limited to a constitutional rational basis standard, nor is it to be narrowly con-
strued to cover only discrimination based solely on sex. In short, the court recog-
nized the sex-stereotype doctrine as an essential element in the application of
Title VII.
The Third Circuit's use of this approach in another pregnancy disability
case, Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 1 is especially significant for the
pension problem. The appellant company raised several defenses for its program
which excluded pregnancy from temporary disability coverage: 1) pregnancy is
not a sickness; 2) it is a situation voluntarily entered into; and 3) the high cost
of insuring pregnancy as a disability. Using insurance and actuarial criteria, the
arguments in favor of allowing a sex-based difference in disability coverage are
much stronger in Wetzel than in pension plans. In Wetzel, the employer and the
insurance carrier knew with certainty that no male employees would become
pregnant. On the other hand, mortality tables reflect only a probability that most
women will live longer than most men. Yet the Wetzel Court, citing Sprogis7 2
struck down the differential coverage as based on sex-stereotypes which overly
categorized distinctions between men and women,73 with the three reasons given
by the employer all failing as defenses under § 703.74
A rigid adherence under Title VII to the Sprogis sex-stereotype approach,
despite certainty that a man cannot become pregnant, leads to the conclusion that
mortality based pension plans will not withstand attack under the sex-stereotype
doctrine.
2. Equal Pay Act
67 EEOC Decision Case No. DC-68-9-183t, 2 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 119 (1969).
68 See note 61 supra.
69 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
70 390 F. Supp. 784 (D. Iowa 1975). See also Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Department of
Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 68 Wis. 2d 345, 228 N.W.2d 649 (1975) (similar result
based on state statute).
71 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
72 See note 66 supra.
73 511 F.2d at 207.
74 Id. at 206.
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Anticipating conflicts between the EEOC and the Wage & Hour Division
in the treatment of overlapping areas, Title VII § 703 (h) provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, ... [i]t shall
not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section
206(d) of Title 29. 75
This section was intended to prevent usurpation of the Equal Pay Act by
Title VII. For example, in 1964 Senator Humphrey noted that valid statistical
differences were allowed under the Equal Pay Act, and therefore would be allowed
under the Civil Rights Act by virtue of § 703 (h).71 This safety valve, however,
was eliminated in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co," when the Third Circuit held
that because these Acts have the "same fundamental purpose against discrimina-
tion"78 the Equal Pay Act cannot undermine the Civil Rights Act through §
703(h).
Under this interpretation, § 703(h) limits permissible activity under the
Equal Pay Act to that which is permitted under the Civil Rights Act. Therefore,
should the Civil Rights Act require that both contributions and benefits be equal,
the Equal Pay Act must likewise require equal benefits and equal contributions.
A federal district court reaches this conclusion in Manhart v. City of Los
Angeles."' There, the defendant maintained a defined benefit pension plan which
required employee contributions.80 As a consequence of planning for equal
benefits, as required by the EEOC, the contributions required of the female
employees were higher per period than those required of the male employees.
The plaintiff, suing on behalf of the female employees of the defendant, moved
for a preliminary injunction. The court, after addressing itself to the likelihood
of plaintiff's success on the merits, surveyed the established case law, statutes, and
administrative regulations, and concluded:
The basic principle which emerges from these authorities and from the
case law is that sexual discrimination under § 703 (a) (1) exists whenever
general fact characteristics of a sex-defined class are automatically applied to
an individual within that class."'
This was, in short, a concise restatement of the sex-stereotype doctrine.
The defendants cited § 703(h) and 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d), "a regulation
of the Wage-Hour Administration which implies that segregated actuarial treat-
75 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
76 110 CONG. REc. 13,663-64 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
77 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
78 Id. at 266.
79 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
80 It is important to note that this case involved employee funding which was assumed
not to occur in the model discussed in text at notes 12-24 infra.
81 387 F. Supp. at 983.
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ment of men and women"" is allowed under the Equal Pay Act. The court
quickly disposed of this: Even if § 206(d) (1) applies to this case, the court
believes that differentiation based on sex segregated actuarial tables constitutes a
differential based on the "factor" of sex in violation of that section."3
Through very strict construction of the 206(d) (1) (iv) exception, the court
read the sex-stereotype doctrine into the Equal Pay Act, the same result as in
Shultz but by a more direct route.
IV. Conclusion
To describe the state of the applicable law, one must first decide which in-
consistencies to overlook. The sex-stereotype doctrine, which meets the intent
and textual understanding of both acts, and which will satisfy both enforcing
agencies, excludes any use of sex-based mortality tables. The equal benefits ap-
proach satisfies the enforcing agencies and makes employment of women more
expensive. Equal contribution satisfies the Wage & Hour Division, but not the
EEOC.
These legal intricacies effectively emasculate the flexibility allowed by
ERISA. If the employer uses an annuity plan, then he must guarantee equal
periodic benefits, absorb the cost differences himself, and somehow ignore this
distinct economic disadvantage of hiring women. 4 This form of benefit planning
involves defined benefit plans, which may be undesirable.8 " The employer must
use a more intricate financial and tax planning scheme." He also becomes
subject to the required Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation charges 7 and
the automatic 30 percent lien upon empoyer net worth in the event of plan
termination."8
The cautious employer must also avoid options which mix mortality-based
benefits with benefits determined notwithstanding life expectancy. For example,
a plan with an option to take an annuity in lieu of a lump-sum distribution89 is
desirable for the employee. However, since the periodic retirement benefits
must be equal, the cash value of the woman's annuity will be greater and, hence,
the woman's lump sum larger than the man's.
In any event, for all the employer's pains, the net periodic income is still
unequal because the federal government uses sex-based mortality tables to tax
annuity income.9 Therefore, if the employer makes the necessary unequal con-
tributions to equalize gross periodic benefits, the man's net annuity income will
be less than the woman's net annuity income.
Dale S. Recinella
82 Id. at 984.
83 Id.
84 Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10.
85 Hurd, Defined Benefit Plans: An Endangered Species? 14 TRUSTS & ESTATES 206-08
(1975).
86 Id.
87 29 U.S.O.A. §§ 1321-23 (1974).
88 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1362-81 (1974).
89 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 72(h).
90 The employee can elect to take the lump sum subject to INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, §
402(e) (1), or take the annuity depending on other income or capital gains.
91 I.R.S. PUBL. No. 575 (1975).
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